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SYMPOSIUM:
2001-2002 SUPREME COURT REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The Honorable Sven Erik Holmes*
This is the eighth year that The University of Tulsa College of Law has
sponsored this symposium on the United States Supreme Court. This annual
review is an important event here at the law school-and one that I am proud to
have been a part of since its inception.
The 2001 Term of the Supreme Court lacked any of the electricity of recent
terms. Indeed, even its most celebrated opinion, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,1
which upheld an Ohio school voucher plan, can be viewed as a mechanistic
application of the Court's previous Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Indeed,
the case may be read as a simple declaration that the issue of school vouchers
should be contested in the political, rather than judicial, arena.
While the cases themselves may not have been remarkable, the Court
addressed an extraordinary range of issues, confirming once again that judicial
opinions have a very real impact on the life of every American. For example,
during the 2001 Term, the Court addressed pornography and Internet regulation
in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition2 and Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union;3 altered the patent law doctrine of equivalence in Festo Corporation v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Company;4 overturned on First Amendment
grounds a state prohibition on judicial candidates "announcing" their views on
controversial topics in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White;5 and decided its
only federalism case in favor of the states, in predictable five-to-four fashion, in
.6Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority.
* United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
1. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
2. 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
3. 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002).
4. 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002).
5. 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
6. 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).
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My remarks today will focus on decisions involving two subject matter areas
of particular importance to a United States District Judge: employment law and
capital punishment. These cases reinforce the proposition that the Supreme Court
is concerned with matters both small and great: small (by comparison)-the
ability of Congress to legislate proper workplace conditions for an individual
worker-and great-society's power under the Constitution to execute an
individual citizen.
I
Before turning to specific cases, permit me to present the 2001 Term by the
numbers-which tell many stories. First, during the 2001 Term, the Supreme
Court issued seventy-five opinions, compared with seventy-nine last year and
seventy-three the year before. Thus, the Court has settled into an approximate
maximum of eighty cases per year. Such a limit has immediate implications. At
the beginning of the 2002 Term, the Court had accepted forty-eight cases. One
can reasonably expect that, of all the cases and controversies from the appellate
courts that are now ready for adjudication, no more than thirty additional cases
will be accepted by the Supreme Court this year for resolution.
Second, seventy-five percent of the cases decided during the 2001 Term
reversed or vacated in whole or in part a decision of a lower court. This fact
underscores the principle that the Supreme Court, in discharging its responsibility
to "say what the law is," prefers the vehicle of reversal rather than that of
affirmance. In this way, the Court is not even arguably bound by the language or
reasoning of the lower court opinion, and can state the law without any such
interference.
Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote ten opinions, more than any other
Justice. Not only does the Chief Justice dominate the Court substantively, he is
actively involved in executing the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court.
Fourth, the number of unanimous decisions reached its lowest point in the
last ten years: twenty-seven. By comparison, thirty-nine cases were decided
unanimously in the 2000 Term.
Fifth, the numbers suggest to many Supreme Court watchers that Justice
Kennedy is actively seeking to succeed Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the event the
Chief Justice decides to step aside at the end of this Term. Short of openly
campaigning for the position, the most demonstrative act by which to advance
oneself for the position of Chief Justice is to express your agreement with the
current Chief Justice whenever possible. The numbers reflect that Chief Justice
Rehnquist agreed with Justice Kennedy in more cases than with any other Justice
on the Court, eighty-four percent. By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed
with Justice Stevens in the least number of cases, fifty-five percent.
Sixth, the Court split five-to-four in twenty-one cases, or twenty-eight
percent of the total. Of these splits, Justice O'Connor voted with the majority in
seventeen cases. Thus, Justice O'Connor continues to exercise enormous
[Vol. 38:235
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influence on the Court, acting as the swing vote in an overwhelming majority of
the Court's most divisive opinions.
Finally, consistent with the numbers, members of the Rehnquist Court
increasingly appear to have assumed settled roles in dealing with contested issues.
This should come as no surprise. October 7, 2002, marked the beginning of the
ninth consecutive Term without any turnover in Court membership. Indeed,
August 3, 1994, the date Justice Breyer took the oath of office, until today is the
longest period without change on the Court since the period between the arrival
of Justice Joseph Story in 1812 and the subsequent arrival of Justice Smith
Thompson in 1823. Linda Greenhouse, the Pulitzer Prize winning journalist for
the New York Times, has examined these facts in light of the sociology of
organizational behavior.' It merits consideration whether, as a result, the Court's
opinions reflect predictability and the acceptance of established roles,
responsibilities, and views, and whether this phenomenon has contributed to the
fact that the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court has become more entrenched
with each passing year.
II
Since coming on the bench in 1995, nearly one-third of all the civil trials I
have conducted involved some area of employment law, including Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 8 the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),9
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 10 and the Family and
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")." Such disputes are a staple of the federal judicial
docket. The volume of cases in this area has created a demand for involvement by
the Supreme Court-and the Court has responded.
The 2001 Term was remarkable for its number of employment law decisions.
The Term was even more remarkable because, almost without exception, the
Court sided with employers on substantive issues, and sided with employees on
procedural issues. All of these cases will have an immediate and substantial
impact on the caseload of every United States District Judge.
First, I will address the substantive cases. In Barnes v. Gorman,2 the Court
held that punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under
Section 202 of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 3 This case not
only limits the potential exposure of offending employers, but also the opinion's
reliance on contract law analysis' 4 foretells the possibility that the Court will
7. Northwestern Law News, The Court: Same Time. Next Year. And Next Year <http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/communicate/newspages/article-full.cfm?eventid=324&pagetype='cu
rrent'> (accessed Nov. 18, 2002).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000).
12. 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002).
13. Id. at 2103.
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utilize this approach to invade further the province of the legislative branch in
connection with statutory construction. In addition, the opinion declares the view,
without legal analysis or authority, that punitive damages "are ... not embraced"
within the general rule that "where legal rights have been invaded and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use
any available remedy to make good the wrong done."' 5
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,6 the Court upheld an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulation permitting the
defense to an ADA claim that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct
threat to that worker's health. 7 This seemingly narrow case may have broad
ramifications since the corollary, which is present in many cases, is that the
employer is capable of deciding what is good for, and therefore protects, the
employee.
In U.S. Airways v. Barnett," the Court held that an "accommodation" under
the ADA that conflicts with a workplace seniority rule is not, absent evidence of
special circumstances, "reasonable."' 9 This effectively reduces the extent to which
employers must go to accommodate employees with disabilities.
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,20 the Court
rejected a Sixth Circuit determination under the ADA that, in order to prove a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, a
plaintiff must show only that her manual disability involved a "class" of manual
activities, and that those activities affect the ability to perform tasks at work.2'
The Supreme Court, in construing the term "substantially limits," stated:
.'[S]ubstantially' in the phrase 'substantially limits' suggests 'considerable' or 'to a
large degree.' The word 'substantial' thus clearly precludes impairments that
interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from
qualifying as disabilities.,
22
The Supreme Court also interpreted the term "major life activities":
"'Major' in the phrase 'major life activities' means important. 'Major life
activities' thus refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life.
In order for performing manual tasks to fit into this category... the manual tasks
in question must be central to daily life. 23
Thus, the Court concluded: "[T]o be substantially limited in performing
manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most
15. Id. at 2102-03 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
16. 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
17. Id. at 2053.
18. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
19. Id. at 1523-24.
20. 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002).
21. Id. at 692.
22. Id. at 691 (citation omitted).
23. Id. (citation omitted).
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people's daily lives., 24 There is simply no understating the impact this opinion will
have on future cases under the ADA.
In Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. , the Court overturned a Labor
Department regulation under the FMLA that counted only that leave which was
granted by the employer after the employer had designated such leave as FMLA
leave.26
As noted, in the four cases decided this Term involving procedural issues,
the Court generally sided with employees. In Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.,27 the Court held that an agreement between an
employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes did not bar
the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific relief, such as backpay, reinstatement,
and damages, in an ADA enforcement action.28
29In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the Court held that an employment
discrimination complaint need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie
case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, but instead must only satisfy the
requirements of notice pleading.3° The Court stated that the McDonnell Douglas
framework is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.31
In Edelman v. Lynchburg College,3 2 the Court upheld the EEOC's relation-
back provisions of a "charge" rule pursuant to Title VII, thus permitting an
otherwise timely filer to verify a discrimination charge after the time for filing has
expired.33
In National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan,34 the Court held that
a Title VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts
must file his or her charge in the appropriate 180 or 300-day period,35 but a
plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment will not be time-barred if all acts
constituting the claim are part of the same unlawful practice, and at least one act
36falls within the filing period.
Based on these cases, the Court's guiding principle with respect to the
federal employment laws is now quite clear: employees should have easy access to
make a claim under the federal anti-discrimination statutes, but the relief that is
available to an individual employee under these laws will be very limited. It is
debatable whether Congress intended such a restrictive construction of these
statutes, which were enacted specifically to help employees.
24. Id.
25. 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
26. Id. at 1162.
27. 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
28. Id. at 765.
29. 122 S. Ct. 992 (2002).
30. Id. at 999.
31. Id. at 997.
32. 122 S. Ct. 1145.
33. Id. at 1152.
34. 122 S. Ct. 2061.
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III
There is no more significant an issue than whether society may execute one
of its members-and, if so, under what circumstances. How society deals with this
issue speaks volumes about our system of justice-and, thus, directly affects
public confidence in the rule'of law.
Since 1976, two separate and distinct developments have seriously
threatened public confidence in capital punishment-and, in turn, public
confidence in our legal system. The first is the reality of extensive procedural
delays, resulting in an average of between eleven and twelve years from the
imposition of a death sentence until execution.37 The fact that, each year, many
more people are sentenced to death than are executed convinced Congress that,
without legislative action, there would be no end to such delays. The fact that
society would impose a sentence of death, and then not carry it out, precipitated a
crisis of public confidence in our legal system. The rule of law simply cannot
survive if society does not enforce its commands.
Congress responded by enacting legislation aimed at ending unnecessary
delays through new procedures governing judicial review in death penalty cases.3 8
The goal of this legislation was to remedy the procedural problems that cause
delay, and the denial of justice that attends unlimited appeals.
More recently, a second development has undermined public confidence in
the death penalty. With the advancement of DNA technology, society is far better
able to evaluate biological evidence to determine accurately actual guilt or
innocence. This has precipitated a crisis of an entirely different nature. As of
October 1, 2002, some 111 individuals originally sentenced to death have been
released as a result of compelling forensic evidence of actual innocence.3 9 In
Illinois alone, DNA evidence established that thirteen individuals on death row
were in fact innocent of the crime charged.4 0  As a result, the governor has
suspended further executions until adequate safeguards can be put in place.41
And, in early October 2002, the state began an extraordinary case-by-case review
of the case of every prisoner on death row. One possible outcome of such review
is that the governor will grant blanket clemency to even the most heinous of
criminals, with respect to whom actual innocence may not be an issue.42
These two developments have now come together in an extraordinary way.
On the one hand, society has the desire to accelerate the process by ending
unlimited appeals; on the other hand, society has reason to believe that there are
factually innocent individuals among those condemned to die. Thus, the macabre
37. Foster v. Fla., 123 S. Ct. 470, 471 (2002).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (limiting federal court review of state convictions).
39. The Innocence Project, DNA News <http://www.innocenceproject.org/dnanews/index.php>
(accessed Nov. 18, 2002).
40. Russ Feingold & Jon Corzine, Halt Executions-Across the Nation <http://www.
truthinjustice.org/natl-moratorium.htm> (accessed May 16, 2002).
41. Id.
42. Kevin McDermott, Illinois Tackles Task of Reviewing Nearly Every Death Sentence; Panel Will
Make Recommendations on Clemency to Governor, St. Louis Post-Dispatch Al (Oct. 13, 2002).
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scenario is that society is actually accelerating the execution of individuals who
may be innocent.
In this context, during the last year, both Justice O'Connor and Justice
Ginsberg made extra-judicial statements suggesting that the death penalty system
suffered from serious deficiencies.43 Such extra-judicial statements created high
expectations that the Court was prepared to embark on a new course in death
penalty jurisprudence.
The cases, however, indicate that the Supreme Court has not met these
expectations and, in fact, has fortified its position. The Court provided powerful
evidence in support of this conclusion by its decision, at the opening of the 2002
Term, not to take two cases: Foster v. Florida," presenting the question of whether
it is cruel and unusual punishment for a person to be on death row for more than
twenty-seven years; and In re Kevin Nigel Stanford,45 presenting the question of
whether the Constitution prohibits the application of the death penalty to juvenile
offenders.
Despite these decisions, the forces surrounding the death penalty appear to
be having some effect. The fact that the Court took up three death penalty cases
during the 2001 Term, and decided all three in favor of the defendant, suggests
that there may be at least a subtle shift under way.
In Atkins v. Virginia,4 the Court determined that it was constitutionally
impermissible to execute mentally retarded defendants.47  This issue has
precipitated heated public debate since 1989 when, in Penry v. Lynaugh,41 the
Court held that there was no constitutional prohibition on such executions. 49 The
Court noted that, since Penry, there have been several developments that would
give rise to a change in the Court's view.50 Such developments, of course, are
primarily the public's questioning of the death penalty.5
In, Ring v. Arizona,52 the Court overturned the death penalty system in
Arizona, which allocated a portion of the fact-finding responsibility in the penalty
phase to the judge.53 Other states with the same system include Alabama,54
5565 60 61Colorado, Delaware,56 Florida, Idaho,58 Indiana, Montana, and Nebraska.
43. O'Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. Times A9 (July 4, 2001); Elisabeth Semel, Con: The
Death Penalty; A Capital Idea? Exhonerations Prove System Isn't Perfect, Daily News of L.A. V1 (Apr.
22, 2001).
44. 810 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 470 (2002).
45. 266 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2001), habeas corpus denied, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002).
46. 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
47. Id. at 2252.
48. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
49. Id. at 340.
50. Akins, 122 S. Ct. at 2248-49.
51. Id.
52. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
53. Id. at 2443.
54. Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (1994).
55. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103 (repealed 2002).
56. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 4209 (repealed 2002).
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In Ring, the Court held that any system in which the judge makes findings of fact
at the sentencing stage regarding whether aggravating circumstances exist fails
under the Sixth Amendment requirement that only a jury render such findings.
The Court determined that this case was a logical extension of Apprendi v. New
12Jersey, and that the 1990 decision upholding the Arizona system, Walton v.
63Arizona,  must be overturned.
Finally, in Kelly v. South Carolina,64 the Court continued its long-running
dispute with the South Carolina Supreme Court over jury instructions regarding
the meaning of the term "life without parole. 65 In Kelly, the Court concluded
that capital jurors must be informed that "life without parole" truly means the
defendant will never be released from prison.66 It is widely believed that this
instruction will result in fewer sentences of death.
The language in almost every decision of the Supreme Court involving the
death penalty is heated-bordering on vitriolic. This is true for the three 2001
Term cases, and even more so for In re Kevin Nigel Stanford and Foster v. Florida
in 2002. The death penalty is an issue about which tempers run high because it
involves deeply felt moral and philosophical beliefs.
Although the views of the individual Justices are entrenched, and the
intensity of those views is reflected in the opinions, this does not mean that the
Court can avoid addressing capital punishment issues. To the contrary, the public
will not tolerate a system that threatens public confidence in the rule of law. The
paramount responsibility of the Supreme Court Justices, and every judge in the
United States, is to promote public confidence in our legal system. With respect
to capital punishment, this responsibility mandates that solutions be found to
systemic problems, including the development of adequate safeguards to ensure
that individuals who may be factually innocent are not put to death. The death
penalty goes to the very heart of confidence in our legal system. If the present
problems with death sentences are not remedied, confidence in the law in all areas
will suffer irreparable harm. Accordingly, despite its reluctance, and despite the
intensity of views of the individual Justices on both sides of the issue, the Supreme
Court has no choice but to keep revisiting death penalty cases. Simply stated, that
is the Court's responsibility to our system of law.
I believe today's program, as always, will be very interesting. Again, I
congratulate the University of Tulsa College of Law for its continued good work
in the study of the Supreme Court.
58. Idaho Code § 19-2515 (Supp. 2002).
59. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2001).
60. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-301 (2001).
61. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2520 (1995).
62. 530 U.S. 566 (2000).
63. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
64. 122 S. Ct. 726 (2002).
65. This dispute commenced in 1994 in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) and
continued in 2000 in Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2000).
66. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 733.
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